On Elif Batuman’s “On Complaining”
Egged on by a number of items in my RSS reader, I spent a small part of my Thanksgiving break with “On Complaining,” Elif Batuman’s long review of Elizabeth Roudinesco’s new book Philosophy in Turbulent Times: Canguilhem, Sartre, Foucault, Althusser, Deleuze, Derrida. Though not without its problems, It’s a good essay, well worth reading in full.*
The first and most obvious question raised by Roudinesco’s book (and Batuman’s response to it) concerns the continuing significance of “continental philosophy,” and more specifically the generation of French intellectuals that came to prominence in the years just after World War II. As she tells it, the real point of Roudinesco’s book becomes obvious only in the final chapter (on Jacques Derrida):
It’s about the end of something: the end of a big adventure, and the dissolution of a group of companions who witnessed the Holocaust and the gulag, who lived and died believing that the pen was as mighty as the sword, and of whom Derrida was ‘the last survivor’.”
For Roudinesco, the intellectual age that spanned Sartre and Foucault and Derrida was her own Greatest Generation, the measure by which all that follow it are judged lacking.
Batuman’s not so sure. She “disagrees with most of what [Roudinesco] says” and clearly wants nothing to do with the latter’s heroization of her friends and fellows. (“Perhaps the greatest intellectual leap Roudinesco requires of her anglophone readers is to entertain, at least temporarily, the notion of ‘continental’ philosophy as a means to combat social ills.”) And every once in a while, in response to some particular, she permits herself the luxury of an unqualified smackdown. (“It’s both wrong and dangerous to believe that a hospital is just like a concentration camp.”) But my sense is that Batuman is not as hostile to continental philosophy as some of the other n+1 writers, who tend to treat it much as Thomas Frank and the Bafflerites did before them: as an academic fad that served mostly as a prose-clotting distraction from the main thrust of critical (i.e., Marxian) philosophy.
The continuing relevance of this tradition is an important question. Though it has certainly not disappeared, its moment of maximum influence on the American academy is now nearly twenty years in the past. With the approaching retirement of that segment of the American professoriate that gained tenure on the backs of Tel Quel and Critical Inquiry, it seems like enough bathwater has drained from the tub of Theory that we should be able to start figuring how many babies have survived the drought.
But the question about continental philosophy’s continuing relevance bears on a more general and more interesting subject than which French names will find their way into dissertation subtitles of the mid-21st century. It’s a question not about the ideas themselves but about the people behind (or, more often for this attention-loving group, out in front of) the ideas, a question that Batuman arrives at by considering Roudinesco’s relationship to the men she is writing about. In her words:
What’s ‘at stake’ here, to use a term beloved of the philosophy of commitment, is the continued existence of such a philosophy. As Roudinesco puts it, how is one to ‘move on from the philosophy of commitment without reverting to the monotony of phantasmal life or of just managing the business of living’? The philosophy of commitment, one assumes, was never supposed to be something you did to make your life feel more exciting – and yet there it is, the problem of ‘the business of living’, paraphrased by Deleuze as the choice between two extreme alternatives: ‘To fancy oneself an academician, or dream of being a Venezuelan guerrilla fighter’.
It’s a real problem – and so is the feeling that there aren’t any cowboys anymore.
That’s a problem I’ll be looking at more in the next day or so. (Click here for part 2.)
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*Obligatory qualification: Much as I appreciate Batuman’s essay, it’s far from perfect. Her presentation of Foucault, for example, is tendentious and reductive even by the Procrustean standards of the review-essay. But while I wouldn’t concede that my qualms about her readings are mere quibbles, Batuman raises too many interesting questions to spend time hassling the problems.


I confess I tuned out after the business about the hospital and the concentration camp. This seemed like the cheapest of cheap shots. Surely we’ve seen that line in The New Republic.
For me, the continuing relevance of what is called continental philosophy is tied to the (unfortunate) recognition that radical secularism — that of Sartre, for example — is still not (and may never be) a satisfying premise for most people. The articulation, or the vision, of a post-secular, post-Enlightenment humanism seems at the heart of Heideggerian poststructuralism (by which I mean: Levinas, Derrida & Agamben).
JA
JA,
Yes! Agreed absolutely–with one minor caveat (don’t know that Derrida fits the humanist mold)–as long as we’re talking about the continuing intellectual relevance of continental philosophy. But as you’ll see in my recent post I’m bending things away from there and taking them in a more sociological direction. (In fact I’m worried that I’m taking them in no direction at all, but hopefully that will sort itself out sooner rather than later.)
bb
Neither this review of the LRB article nor the second part of it deal with the absurdities cited in Batuman’s article, including her highlighting Althusser’s murder of his wife as a “work” that it is his right to have the last say on. Hitler would love to have Roudinesco’s book as a way of defending himself. If you want radical secularism, go to Mein Kampf.
I don’t think you’re reading the article very carefully, Jerry. Batuman starts her section on Althusser by saying, “Politicisation takes a particularly ugly form in the next chapter, on The Future Lasts a Long Time, a memoir Althusser wrote after he murdered his wife, Hélène, and was judged mentally incompetent to stand trial.” From there it remains no less clear that Batuman thinks that Althusser’s crime was a crime and that Roudinesco’s defense of it was both ridiculous and repugnant. In fact, I’d go so far as to say that it’s the Althusser section that provides the linchpin for Batuman’s whole case against Roudinesco’s book and the philosophical world it celebrates.